Between November 9, 2006 and January 17, 2007, more than 99 percent of the almost 34,000 people who commented told the Department of Energy (DOE) that its plans for “Complex 2030” – the vision of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex in the year 2030 – were unacceptable. Instead, people had a different vision of 2030: one in which the U.S. will have fulfilled its requirements to make good faith efforts at nuclear disarmament. (See Voices, Winter 2006/2007.)

Those scoping comments were the initial stage of a formal legal process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in which the semi-autonomous nuclear weapons part of DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), gathers comments about what should be included in the programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS). In December 2007, DOE responded to the comments by issuing the Draft Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Draft SPEIS), in three volumes, totaling almost 2,000 pages. DOE will accept comments on the draft SPEIS until April 10, and it is holding public hearings in 13 locations near the weapons sites and a hearing in Washington, D.C. between February 21 and March 27.

Besides changing the name from “Complex 2030” to “Complex Transformation,” how did DOE respond to the comments? Not very well.

DOE’s “preferred alternative” in the draft SPEIS is:

• Build a new plutonium pit factory at Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) in New Mexico that could make up to 80 bomb cores per year. How much the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement – Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) would cost to build and operate for decades is not provided.
• Build a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, which would continue to be the center of production and storage of the highly enriched uranium secondaries. How much that new facility would cost is not provided.
• Maintain the Pantex Plant in Texas as the weapons assembly/disassembly and high explosives production and manufacturing center.
• Maintain tritium supply production and consolidate tritium research and development at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Continue some tritium activities at Sandia National Lab in New Mexico and Livermore Lab in California, as well as other research and development activities.
• Maintain the Nevada Test Site for underground nuclear testing, and use it for testing of large quantities of high explosives. A new “next generation facility” for hydrodynamic testing would be at the Nevada site when the existing LANL Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynmaic Test facility “approaches the end of life in approximately 2025.”

In short, all of the existing nuclear weapons sites would be continued for the next century so that the United States, in the words of the draft SPEIS, would:

• Maintain core competencies in nuclear weapons;
• Maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and
• Create a responsible nuclear weapons infrastructure that is cost-effective, and has adequate capacity to meet reasonably foreseeable national security requirements; and consolidate Category I/II SNM [Special Nuclear Materials] at fewer sites and locations within sites to reduce the risk and safeguards costs.

Thus, the draft SPEIS states:

“A transformed Complex with demonstrated capabilities would ensure that the nation’s nuclear deterrent would remain credible, and could support additional reductions in the stockpile, if directed by the President and the Congress. A transformed Complex is also expected to be safer, more secure, and less costly to maintain.” Furthermore, “NNSA anticipates the footprint of the current Complex could be reduced by 20-30 percent in the future.”

Thousands of people made scoping comments that the SPEIS should address how to implement Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That Article states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution says that treaties ratified by the Senate are the “supreme law of the land.” The U.S. Senate ratified the NPT on March 13, 1969, and the treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970.

Nonetheless, the draft SPEIS states that:

“does not analyze alternatives to the United States’ national security policy. Rather, it examines the environmental effects of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives for execution of the program based on the existing policy and foreseeable changes in this policy.”

In response to the overwhelming opposition to maintaining the massive (35 million square feet of facilities at eight locations) nuclear weapons complex, DOE specifically refuses to include and analyze other alternatives, including pursuing dismantlement and refraining from designing and building new nuclear weapons, implementing “curatorship” or surveillance and non-nuclear testing of existing weapons without producing new weapons, and producing no new plutonium pits, among others.

Instead, the alternatives included in the draft SPEIS are plutonium pit production facilities that would produce between 50 and 200 bomb cores per year. Thousands of people pointed out in their scoping comments that no pit production is needed, since pits last for at least 100 years and the U.S. has more than 12,000 pits stored at the Pantex Plant. The draft SPEIS response:

“While the current state of knowledge is that there may not be a need to produce pits in the near future because of the plutonium’s longevity, NNSA cannot be certain that other issues associated with pits, other than the aging of plutonium materials, would never arise. Accordingly, prudent management requires that NNSA maintain a capacity to produce pits as long as this nation maintains its nuclear stockpile.”

Tens of thousands of scoping comments opposed new nuclear weapons, including the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. In December 2007, Congress eliminated all RRW funding. The draft SPEIS response:

“The RRW would not affect the proposed action of this SPEIS related to restructuring SNM facilities, or the proposed action to restructure R&D [research and development] facilities….However, a production capacity for plutonium and highly-enriched uranium components as well as weapons assembly and disassembly, will be required for the foreseeable future with or without implementation of RRW.”

Many commentors pointed out that one of the eight current nuclear weapons sites, the Kansas City Plant (KCP) in Missouri, which manufactures the non-nuclear components (more than 95 percent of the total) of nuclear weapons was inappropriately excluded from the SPEIS. Thus, the SPEIS would not include the total costs and environmental impacts of the Bombplex. The draft SPEIS response:

“Because the non-nuclear operations at KCP are essential and do not duplicate the work at other sites, no proposal for combination or elimination of these missions was formulated. A recent analysis has concluded that transferring these KCP non-nuclear operations to a site other than one within the immediate Kansas City area would not be cost-effective. Consequently, the non-nuclear operations would remain at either the current KCP or a new facility in the Kansas City area, and would neither affect nor be affected by the decisions regarding the alternatives in this SPEIS.”

The draft SPEIS provides little information about the costs of the existing nuclear weapons Complex or the future Bombplex. In December 2007, an “Independent Business Case Analysis of Consolidation Options for the Defense Programs SNM and Weapons Production Missions” was issued as a reference to the draft SPEIS. That analysis examined the seven SNM sites (excluding KCP), and concluded:

“NNSA spends $1.8 billion (including $200 million for SNM transportation) annually on SNM operations, of which about $300 million is devoted to new construction or renovation….At least an anticipated $100 million per year will be required for routine maintenance; thus, at a constant budget level, only $200 million annually would be available for construction of new facilities. Clearly, this is insufficient for implementation of any of these consolidation options on the schedules proposed in the SPEIS.”

Therefore, building the Bombplex will cost billions more than what the U.S. is currently spending on the nuclear weapons complex, and the current funding is higher than the Cold War peak spending when thousands of bombs were being produced each year. Additionally, the draft SPEIS includes no discussion of the costs of cleaning up the Bombplex. That’s a recurring problem, as in its Budget Request to Congress for Fiscal Year 2009, DOE has dramatically increased the estimates for the life cycle costs of cleaning up the wastes from the existing nuclear weapons complex to $305 billion.

Many scoping comments pointed out that the Bombplex would create thousands of cubic meters of radioactive and hazardous wastes and that the SPEIS must analyze the impacts of leaving such wastes at the generator site forever, or creating new waste disposal sites. Commentors pointed out that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico, the only existing disposal site for plutonium-contaminated waste, is to close in 2030 and its capacity is limited to the approximate amount of existing transuranic (TRU) waste. In response, the draft SPEIS states:

“In the future, if inventory projects show a need for additional disposal capacity for TRU waste, DOE would initiate the development of strategies for expanding such capacity at an appropriate time. However, because DOE has made no plans to date regarding the location or design of a waste disposal facility for TRU waste beyond WIPP’s current capacity, this SPEIS assumed WIPP as the disposal location for TRU waste generated under each alternative, for the purposes of transportation analysis only.”

PREPARING FOR THE PUBLIC HEARINGS

Even before the public hearings began, citizen groups were analyzing the draft SPEIS. In its February 2008 newsletter, the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance (OREPA) has an extended critique of the draft PEIS. In part, OREPA states:

“If we hope to achieve a nuclear weapons free world in our lifetimes, we have to see that Complex Transformation is not just about the RRW or a new Pit Facility, or even about “responsiveness” or efficiency—buzzwords that appear over and over in the draft PEIS. Complex Transformation is about an enduring nuclear stockpile—it is pure nuclear proliferation.

Each of the proposals put forward by the NNSA to create a new weapons complex to design, build and test bombs, whether it is consolidated, reduced in size or spread across
the country, represents a perilous departure from the United States’ obligation to pursue complete nuclear disarmament at an early date—the promise we made in 1970 in the
Nonproliferation Treaty.

Seen clearly, Complex Transformation is an attempt to solidify nuclear weapons as the currency of power for the next century. If we do this, we will compel similar actions by other states. Herein lies the great peril for all of us. A new weapons complex does not make us more secure, it makes us greater targets.”

Tri-Valley CAREs in Livermore, California, issued its “How to Stop a Bombplex” in January. In part, it states:

“The DOE claims that the ‘Complex Transformation’ plan is their ‘vision for a smaller, safer, more secure and less expensive nuclear weapons complex that leverages the scientific and technical capabilities of [its] workforce and meets national security requirements.’

First there is the obvious: We don’t accept a somewhat smaller nuclear weapons complex refurbished with new capabilities and new facilities in order to more efficiently develop and produce nuclear bombs (as in more nukes per square foot). Moreover, the most safe, secure and least expensive nuclear weapons are the ones we don’t build at all.

Second, in laying out its ‘Complex Transformation’ plan, the DOE takes credit for proposing to demolish old buildings that, at least in some cases, are already in the queue to be torn down and decontaminated. That’s not really progress.

Third, the removal of some nuclear materials from facilities that are most vulnerable to terrorist attack may be laudable, but can and should occur solely for safety and security reasons. For example, by artificially tying the consolidation of nuclear materials to ‘Complex Transformation,’ the DOE is attempting to ensure that Livermore Lab’s plutonium continues to be used in service of nuclear weapons research.”

At many of the sites, local member groups of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) are providing information and working with other groups to encourage people to attend the hearings and providing talking points to facilitate their comments. They also provided additional means for making comments by April 10, 2008, when the comment period ends.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

Even though the draft SPEIS was delayed about six months from DOE’s original schedule, primarily because of the large number of public comments, DOE still hopes to publish the final SPEIS in August. The Record of Decision would be issued before the Bush administration leaves office.

However, if community and national groups are successful and tens of thousands of people comment on the draft SPEIS, that schedule could again be delayed. Moreover, the many likely deficiencies from rushing the final SPEIS are likely to spark litigation, which could eventually lead to a court decision to require the next administration to issue a new document. Or a new administration could change nuclear weapons policies and issue a very different PEIS.

In addition, many people will be encouraging Congress to eliminate funding for the Bombplex, including the RRW, LANL pit production, and new facilities. Moreover, many in Congress support having a debate about nuclear weapons policy, including having a new Nuclear Posture Review. Perhaps they will even make public comments on the Bombplex part of that debate.

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