WIPP IS NOT MEETING ITS SHIPMENT AND DISPOSAL GOALS

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico is not achieving the goals set three years ago to accelerate disposal of nuclear weapons waste at the world’s first underground geologic repository. A new 93-page report, The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: How Well is “Accelerated Cleanup” Working? issued by SRIC, shows that WIPP has disposed of about 75 percent of the waste planned, or about the same amounts as before the “accelerated cleanup” program was announced.

The report is the first study of how well WIPP and the sites with large amounts of nuclear weapons waste are meeting the performance goals established in 2002 when the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued “Performance Management Plans” (PMP). The plans were designed to speed up shipments of waste to WIPP so that millions of cubic feet of dangerous radioactive waste would be disposed by 2012, or about 20 years earlier than then scheduled. The “Accelerated Cleanup” Program also was supposed to save billions of dollars.

The report analyzes the plans and the actual performance at the major sites that are to send transuranic (TRU or plutonium-contaminated) waste to WIPP – Hanford, Washington; Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico; Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), Tennessee, and Savannah River Site (SRS), South Carolina, as well as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California. Local citizen watchdog organizations monitoring those sites also participated in preparing the report.

For Fiscal Year 2003, the WIPP PMP projected disposal of 8,939 cubic meters of contact-handled (CH) TRU waste; 7,542 cubic meters was actually disposed. In Fiscal Year 2004, the WIPP PMP projected disposal of 12,366 cubic meters; 8,810 cubic meters was actually disposed. Therefore, for the two-year period, 77 percent of the total amount projected was actually disposed.

The amount of waste sent in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 by individual sites varies from the amounts projected in their plans. SRS exceeded the disposal amounts included in the WIPP PMP – shipping 5,525 cubic meters, as compared with the 2,132 cubic meters planned. Hanford shipped 698 cubic meters, as compared with the 666 cubic meters planned. However, INL, the site which has about half of all the CH-waste in the WIPP inventory, shipped 909 cubic meters as compared with the 8,650 cubic meters in the WIPP PMP, or about 11 percent of what was planned. Los Alamos shipped 327 cubic meters, as compared with the 1,835 cubic meters planned.

Updating the report for fiscal year 2005, which ends on September 30, will again show that WIPP will not achieve the planned goal of 12,247 cubic meters being disposed. The volume of waste disposed this year will be less than in Fiscal Year 2004.

What is the “Accelerated Cleanup” Program?
In February 2002, DOE announced its “Accelerated Cleanup” program, which is supposed to reduce costs and risks for the millions of cubic meters of radioactive waste (high-level, TRU, and low-level) at dozens of sites around the country. The program includes additional funds “when a site and DOE reach agreement on an expedited schedule that shows measurable gains and can be held accountable.” State governments where DOE sites were located were to agree to Letters of Intent to demonstrate their commitment to the program.

Congress supported the DOE program and in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required that DOE “shall allocate, to each site for which the Secretary has submitted to the congressional defense committees a site performance management plan, the amount of those funds that such plan requires.”

A major element of the program is to dispose of TRU waste more quickly, which is said to save money by reducing the operating costs of WIPP over its lifetime and by reducing waste storage costs at many of the sites. In the summer of 2002, 18 DOE sites developed PMPs which provided some details about how wastes at those sites would be managed and about measures that could be taken to speed up clean up of the sites. At sites with TRU waste and at WIPP, the PMPs proposed various measures to change existing schedules and practices, including characterizing the waste inventory, developing new shipping containers and procedures, changing operations at WIPP, and modifying regulatory requirements. The site that has shipped the largest amount of waste to WIPP, the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, CO, did not prepare a PMP because no acceleration was planned beyond the schedule of completing waste shipments to WIPP by 2005.

The SRIC report analyzes how well each site and WIPP are meeting the goals and milestones of the plans, discusses how well projected cost savings are justified, and reviews regulatory and other relevant issues. The analysis primarily covers the first two+ years of the plans, updating the information through at least 2004, and in some cases, up to July 2005.

Basic Findings regarding TRU waste inventory
* At every site there are differences between inventory used in the site PMP and the WIPP PMP, which are unexplained in the documents. For example, the WIPP PMP says that Hanford has 16,100 cubic meters of CH waste, while the Hanford PMP puts the total at 29,780 cubic meters. Moreover, the Hanford Solid Waste Disposal Final Environmental Impact Statement of 2004 shows almost 50 percent higher volume of TRU waste than the Hanford PMP.

* The information in several PMPs does not include some of the TRU wastes actually stored at the site. For example, the LANL PMP does not include the hundreds of drums of classified material and the hundreds of cubic meters of sealed sources.

* In some cases the PMP inventory estimates are not consistent with legal or regulatory requirements or agreements. For example, at INL, there are serious discrepancies about the size of the TRU inventory between the State of Idaho and DOE, especially regarding the 25,000 to 36,000 cubic meters of buried wastes, which is the subject of ongoing litigation.

* Most of the site PMPs have no estimates about the amount of Remote-Handled (RH) TRU waste, even when the site acknowledges it has such waste and even when the WIPP PMP contains such estimates. For example, Hanford, which has the largest amounts of RH waste, does not include any amounts of such waste in either the WIPP or Hanford PMP, although the WIPP PMP includes 3,235 RH waste shipments to WIPP from Hanford. Both the WIPP and ORR PMPs includes substantial volumes of RH waste, although the amounts are substantially different – 1,840 cubic meters in the WIPP PMP and 996 cubic meters in the ORR PMP.

Basic Findings regarding TRU waste shipments
* The number of truck shipments of waste each fiscal year to WIPP shown in the site PMPs are not consistent with the numbers shown in the WIPP PMP. These differences are not explained in the documents. In some cases the differences are large. For example, the Hanford PMP estimates more than twice as many shipments (2,465 versus 990) during the period from 2003 to 2015 compared with the WIPP PMP.

* The shipping estimates in the PMPs differ from the “Corporate Performance Measures” included in the annual DOE Budget Request to Congress, but DOE neither describes nor explains the discrepancies. In addition, the actual volume to TRU waste disposed at WIPP is not accurately reported in the Budget Request.

Basic Findings regarding cost savings
* None of the PMPs include or reference baseline cost estimates against which claims of cost savings can be evaluated. For some sites, there is no actual quantification of savings. For example, the Hanford PMP states that the savings would be “tens of millions of dollars in lifecycle costs.” The INL PMP includes no specified amount of cost savings for TRU waste. In addition, the claimed cost savings are generally not detailed to particular milestones so that additional or lesser savings cannot be estimated based on actual performance.

* The fact that several sites are not meeting the milestones used in the PMPs should mean that some of the near-term projected cost savings will not be realized. Since some sites are behind schedule, even the pre-“accelerated cleanup” timeline, there could be increased costs above the baseline.

* In some cases, such as LLNL and LANL, some of the projected cost “savings” appear to be based on transferring the costs of waste management and environmental remediation from Environmental Management to the National Nuclear Security Administration. Such “savings” are based on accounting only, not on any savings to the taxpayers, so they should not be considered to provide any actual cost savings.

Basic findings regarding regulatory compliance issues
* Each PMP recognizes that each site’s regulatory requirements are unique, and in some cases there is a brief mention of requirements related to TRU waste. Yet, regulatory requirements are not well integrated into the site PMPs. For example, the resolution of regulatory issues regarding the size of the TRU inventory at INL and whether any “waste incidental to reprocessing” is reclassified as TRU could have a large effect on the TRU inventory at that site. The INL PMP does not adequately address those matters.

* The PMPs do not discuss the major TRU inventory issue of high-level waste reclassification that has embroiled DOE, some states, and Congress over the past two years. The issue relates to whether some waste in tanks that store high-level waste at Hanford, INL, and SRS can be reclassified as low-level or TRU waste. Similarly, the Hanford and WIPP PMPs do not discuss the DOE plans to declare some Hanford tanks to be TRU waste.

Basic findings on other relevant issues
* Transportation needs, especially for more and larger shipping containers, are included in some site and WIPP PMPs. But some vital transportation issues are not mentioned in the PMPs. For example, state concerns regarding the “single containment” TRUPACT-III for large items are not included. State concerns about routing and inspections are not adequately discussed.

* Privatization is a significant issue that is not adequately discussed in the PMPs. For example, at INL and ORR, major waste treatment contracts are integral parts of “accelerated cleanup.” The recent termination of the BNFL contract at the INL Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility is a current example of some of the dangers of delays, and cost increases, that can occur from privatization.

* The PMPs proposal for eastern and western “hubs” as interim storage sites before waste is shipped to WIPP did not include major, foreseeable impacts. For example, shipments from two sites to Hanford triggered a lawsuit, which has prevented further shipments, even though they are included in the PMP. Although using SRS for shipments from the Mound site in Ohio did not result in litigation, it was a major factor in bringing additional resources to SRS (rather than to other sites) which allowed SRS to be the only site to exceed its PMP shipment estimates.

* None of the PMPs address the expanded TRU inventory that will result from proposed additional plutonium production either at LANL or at the “Modern Pit Facility” -- DOE’s proposed replacement for Rocky Flats, which created much of the “legacy” TRU waste.

What should be done?
* DOE, Congress, and the public need a comprehensive, integrated planning and evaluation process for managing TRU wastes. The site and WIPP PMPs have not provided such a process. Either the PMPs should be eliminated or they must be dramatically revised. Any new plans should at a minimum provide the following.
* Be updated at least annually to reflect actual experiences and changing circumstances. The existing PMPs are about three years old and are outdated.
* Include a TRU waste inventory that accurately reflects CH and RH wastes that are at the sites, regulatory requirements for storage, shipment or disposal, and waste classification or other disputes and uncertainties about the inventory.
* Provide shipment estimates based on the most current WIPP shipping schedule, while also including past experience regarding the amount of waste per shipment and the amount of waste by volume (in cubic meters) that will be transported or are included in contracts.
* Be consistent with annual DOE Budget Requests to Congress and the “Corporate Performance Measures.” Currently, it is impossible for the public or Congress to know what are the performance goals, what the baseline costs of achieving them are, whether the goals are met or exceeded or not met, and how they should be revised to reflect changing conditions.
* Be subject to public input and be publicly available, both electronically and in hard copy. Adequate time for public comment would improve the quality of the plans. Public input could also increase the credibility and acceptance of the plans.
* Clearly explain any discrepancies regarding inventory, shipments, and schedules, if the WIPP plan and site specific plans are different.
* Straightforwardly discuss the alternatives for waste storage and disposal, since the highest current estimated volumes for both CH and RH waste exceed the legal capacity limits at WIPP. Issues that should be addressed include which sites should have priority for disposal of their wastes and how “excess” waste can be handled; what to do about disposal of new wastes generated by new production.
* Include projected volumes of TRU waste from proposed future plutonium pit manufacturing.
* Address transportation issues and uncertainties, including concerns about the single containment TRUPACT-III, as well as issues related to any “hubs” or “interim storage” sites for TRU wastes that are not shipped directly to WIPP, and options for transporting such wastes.
* Include regulatory requirements and matters in dispute, including how such issues are being addressed and any uncertainties about their resolution.

* DOE should develop lifecycle baseline cost estimates for each site and make the bases and assumptions for those costs publicly available. Any projected cost savings from “accelerated cleanup” should be compared with the baseline costs, and each major cleanup project should have a separate cost bases so that whether projected cost savings are achieved can be determined.

* DOE must develop consistent and reliable inventory estimates for both CH and RH waste on a site-by-site basis. Unless, based on those estimates, DOE determines that the current legal limits for the amount of CH- and RH-TRU waste will not be exceeded, it should publicly discuss its plans to address the projected overcapacity at WIPP, including options that it could implement.

* DOE Budget Requests to Congress should include accurate historic performance measurements and current and future year projections should be those in DOE’s performance plans.

* Congress should revise the law to either require comprehensive and accurate PMPs or it should eliminate the existing legal provision that funding allocations are to be based on the PMPs. The existing PMPs are not being followed by DOE, the sites, or Congress.

* Risk Reduction should not be quantified based on the amount of TRU waste at any site, rather the site’s risks should include all wastes. Any risk reduction regarding TRU waste should also include the risk increase if waste is being shipped to the site. Future waste generation at the site should also be added into any calculations.

The report was supported by a grant from the Citizens’ Monitoring and Technical Assistance Fund and is available on SRIC’s website: www.sric.org/nuclear/docs/wipp_cleanup.pdf

WIPP CH-WASTE DISPOSAL BY SITE BY FISCAL YEAR

(Amounts in cubic meters).

Southwest Research and Information Center
105 Stanford SE
PO Box 4524
Albuquerque, NM 87196
505/262-1862
fax: 505/262-1864

For further information contact Info@sric.org.